McDaniel v. McBrayer: Reform Need for Rule 68 - The Pendulum of Protection Is Swinging Unevenly by Williams, LaDonna
North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 27
Number 1 Volume 27, Number 1 Article 5
10-1-2004
McDaniel v. McBrayer: Reform Need for Rule 68 -
The Pendulum of Protection Is Swinging Unevenly
LaDonna Williams
Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Williams, LaDonna (2004) "McDaniel v. McBrayer: Reform Need for Rule 68 - The Pendulum of Protection Is Swinging Unevenly,"
North Carolina Central Law Review: Vol. 27 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol27/iss1/5
CASENOTES
McDANIEL v. McBRAYER: REFORM NEEDED FOR RULE 68 -
THE PENDULUM OF PROTECTION IS
SWINGING UNEVENLY
LADONNA WILLIAMS*
INTRODUCTION
The right to seek redress for personal injury or property damage as
the result of the negligence of others is ingrained into every American
citizen.' It is the American way. Commercials, mailings, law firm ad-
vertisements and television shows encourage lawsuits for numerous
personal injury and property damage claims. The North Carolina
Legislature, recognizing the need for citizens with small damage
claims to be represented by an attorney and have their day in court,
established North Carolina General Statute Section 6-21.1.2
Under North Carolina General Statute Section 6-21.1, trial court
judges are given discretion to award attorney fees over and above a
verdict for judgments of $10,000.00 or less.3 The balance to this stat-
ute is provided by Rule 68 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which allows a defendant to offer judgment and thus gain
protection in the nature of recovering costs of litigation incurred after
the service of the offer of judgment.4
The right to be represented in small claims is important to our soci-
ety. But, has the pendulum now swung too far in favor of plaintiffs
and taken the protection for defendants out of Rule 68 of the North
* Special thanks to H. Lee Davis, Jr. for encouraging me to go to law school and for
encouraging me to submit a Case Note. Special thanks to Kent L. Hamrick for suggesting the
title for the Case Note.
Both are partners in the law firm of Davis & Hamrick, L.L.P. located in Winston-Salem, North
Carolina
Also, special thanks to all the attorneys in the law firm of Davis & Hamrick with whom I had the
pleasure of working with over the past 23 years before deciding to go to law school - thank you
for being an influence on my life. (LaDonna Williams is a second year student at North Carolina
Central University School of Law).
1. The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a right to a trial
by jury for amounts in controversy exceeding Twenty Dollars. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.1 (2003).
3. Id.
4. N.C. R. Civ. P. 68.
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Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure? Does the discretion of courts to
award costs that continue to defeat offers of judgment allow plaintiffs
and their attorneys to forego serious evaluation of the case? Is an
ethical dilemma created for attorneys who gamble in court, knowing
that if a jury verdict is awarded, the court, in its discretion, can tack on
costs and attorney fees, which may far exceed any amount the attor-
ney might have reasonably received? Each year numerous appeals
are filed questioning the award of costs in cases where reasonable of-
fers of judgment were made. While this question was seemingly re-
solved by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Poole v. Miller,'
litigants and judges continue to question the law. Plaintiffs and de-
fendants alike deserve the same protection under the law. Where is
the middle of the road where both can be protected?
This note examines the recent decision in McDaniel v. McBrayer6 in
which the court of appeals once again upheld the trial court's discre-
tion in awarding attorney's fees after offers of judgment were made.7
This note outlines the law that has developed since Poole regarding
Rule 68. This review suggests that there needs to be legislative re-
form. The precedent before Poole, as outlined in Purdy v. Brown,' or
the Federal approach in Marryshow v. Flynn,9 are more uniform in
allowing plaintiffs with small claims a right to representation while
balancing that right with protection for the defendant when reasona-
ble offers of judgment are made.
BACKGROUND
North Carolina General Statute Section 6-21.1 (2003) provides:
In any personal injury or property damage suit, or suit against an in-
surance company under a policy issued by the defendant insurance
company and in which the insured or beneficiary is the plaintiff, upon
a finding by the court that there was an unwarranted refusal by the
defendant insurance company to pay the claim which constitutes the
basis of such suit, instituted in a court of record, where the judgment
for recovery of damages is ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or less, the
presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee
to the duly licensed attorney representing the litigant obtaining a judg-
5. Poole v. Miller, 464 S.E.2d 409 (N.C. 1995).
6. McDaniel v. McBrayer, 595 S.E.2d 784 (N.C. App. 2004).
7. Id.
8. The plaintiff should bear the burden of costs after an offer of judgment is made. Purdy
v. Brown, 296 S.E.2d 459 (N.C. 1982).
9. Marryshow v. Flynn, 986 F.2d 689, 692 (4th Cir. 1993). To make a proper comparison
between an offer of judgment that includes costs incurred and the judgment finally obtained,
only costs incurred up until the offer of judgment should be added to the verdict.
2004]
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ment for damages in said suit, said attorney's fee to be taxed as part of
the court costs. 10
The general rule is that attorney fees are not allowed as costs in a civil
action. However, Section 6-21.1 is an exception to the general rule.11
Section 6-21.1 is intended to provide relief for plaintiffs whose claim is
of such a small amount that the plaintiff could not afford to pursue the
claim if they had to pay their attorney out of the recovery.12
Certainly, it is important to allow a plaintiff an opportunity to bring
a claim; nonetheless, the court of appeals in Harrison v. Herbin13
stated:
While [Section 6-21.1] is aimed at encouraging injured parties to press
their meritorious but pecuniarily small claims, we do not believe that
it was intended to encourage parties to refuse reasonable settlement
offers and give rise to needless litigation by guaranteeing that counsel
will, in all cases, be compensated. 4
North Carolina General Statute Section 1A-1, Rule 68 balances
North Carolina General Statute Section 6-21.1 by providing protec-
tion to a defendant if a plaintiff rejects an offer of judgment made by a
defendant. If a judgment finally obtained is less favorable than the
offer of judgment, then the plaintiff must bear the costs and attorney's
fees incurred after the offer of judgment. 15 The purpose of the enact-
ment of Rule 68 was to encourage settlement between the parties and
work to avoid the case having to be litigated in court.16
The question arose in Poole, as to the meaning of "judgment finally
obtained" within Rule 68.17 Rule 68(a) states:
(a) Offer of Judgment. - At any time more than 10 days before the
trial begins, a party defending a claim may serve upon the adverse
party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the
money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs
then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the ad-
verse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party
may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of
service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An of-
fer not accepted within 10 days after its service shall be deemed with-
drawn and evidence of the offer is not admissible except in a
proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.1 (2003).
11. Hicks v. Albertson, 200 S.E.2d 40, 42 (N.C. 1973).
12. Id. at 42.
13. Harrison v. Herbin, 241 S.E.2d 108 (N.C. App. 1978).
14. Id. at 109.
15. N.C. R. Civ. P. 68; Scallon v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. App. 1982).
16. Scallon, 293 S.E.2d at 844.
17. Poole v. Miller, 464 S.E.2d 409, 410 (N.C. 1995).
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costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is
made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
18
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Poole interpreted the mean-
ing of "judgment finally obtained" within Rule 68(a) of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure to mean the jury's verdict plus any
costs added to the verdict by the court.19 In Poole, the defendant
made an offer of judgment of $6,000.00 with costs accrued. The plain-
tiff rejected the offer. The jury awarded plaintiff $5,721.73. The trial
court held that plaintiff was entitled to the jury award plus costs and
attorney's fees even though some of the costs and attorney's fees were
incurred after the offer of judgment was made. The trial court rea-
soned that "judgment finally obtained" under Rule 68 did not mean
jury verdict.2 ° The court of appeals then reversed the judgment that
allowed costs incurred after the offer of judgment was made.21 How-
ever, the supreme court agreed with the trial court's decision and
found that the judgment finally obtained by the trial court is the cor-
rect amount to be compared to the offer of judgment in determining if
plaintiff is responsible for costs incurred after the offer of judgment
was made. Because the trial court has discretion to add attorney
fees under North Carolina General Statute Section 6-21.1, this ruling
granted almost unlimited power to the court to add enough attorney
fees to exceed any offer of judgment.
The supreme court's ruling in Poole affected the defendant's protec-
tion under Rule 68 dramatically. Before Poole the supreme court held
in Purdy v. Brown2 3 that "any attorney's fees which were incurred
after the offer of judgment was made must be borne by the plain-
tiff."'24 Plaintiff had demanded $300,000.00 for injuries from defen-
dant's negligence. Defendant made an offer of judgment in the
amount of $5,001.00. The plaintiff rejected the offer and the case was
tried. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the
amount of $3,500.00. Plaintiff requested that costs and attorney's fees
be taxed against the defendant. The court held that defendant was
only required to pay costs and the attorney's fees incurred before the
offer of judgment was made. The court held that Rule 68 provides
protection after an offer of judgment is made by the defendant.2 5
However, the ruling in Poole created a safety net for plaintiffs where
18. N.C. R. Civ. P. 68(a).
19. Poole, 464 S.E.2d at 412.
20. Id. at 410.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 413.
23. Purdy v. Brown, 296 S.E.2d 459 (N.C. 1982).
24. Id. at 463.
25. Id.
2004]
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little pressure, if any, is placed on plaintiffs to seriously evaluate their
claim and determine if the defendant has made a fair and reasonable
offer of settlement.
Four years after Poole, the North Carolina Court of Appeals out-
lined the following factors that trial courts are to consider in exercis-
ing discretion in awarding attorney fees pursuant to North Carolina
General Statute 6-21.1:
(1.) settlement offers made prior to the institution of the action ... ;(2.) offers of judgment pursuant to Rule 68, and whether the "judg-
ment finally obtained" was more favorable than such offers;(3.) whether defendant unjustly exercised "superior bargaining
power;"(4.) in the case of an unwarranted refusal by an insurance company,
the "context in which the dispute arose;"
(5.) the timing of settlement offers;(6.) the amount of the settlement offers as compared to the jury ver-
dict .... 26
While the trial court has discretion whether to award attorney fees,
the court's power is not unbridled. An award of attorney fees may be
overturned on appeal when the court abuses its discretion and its rul-
ing "is manifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it could
not have been the result of a reasoned decision."27 In awarding attor-
ney fees, the court must make specific findings as to the Washington
factors, including the time and labor expended, the legal skill required
by the attorney, the customary fees for similar work, and the attor-
ney's experience or ability.28 The timing and amount of the settle-
ment offers compared to the jury verdict are significant factors which
the court is to consider in determining whether to award attorney
fees.29
While Poole established that "judgment finally obtained" means
verdict plus any applicable adjustment, the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Roberts v. Swain3° addressed the question as to whether post-
offer of judgment costs could also be added to the jury verdict to de-
termine the "judgment finally obtained."'" The supreme court inter-
preted that the Poole decision only answered the question as to
whether judgment finally obtained was the same as jury verdict.32 The
defendant in Roberts argued that the plaintiff was only entitled to
costs incurred up to the date of the offer of judgment made pursuant
26. Washington v. Horton, 513 S.E.2d 331, 334-35 (N.C. App. 1999) (citations omitted).
27. Thorpe v. Perry-Riddick, 551 S.E.2d 852, 855 (N.C. App. 2001).
28. Id. at 856.
29. Culler v. Hardy, 526 S.E.2d 698, 702 (N.C. App. 2000).
30. Roberts v. Swain, 538 S.E.2d 566 (N.C. 2000).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 568.
5
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to Rule 68. The defendant further argued that if post-offer costs were
allowed to be added to the verdict, it would discourage settlement.
33
However, the court held that the definition of "judgment finally ob-
tained" in Poole did not limit adjustments to the verdict to be for pre-
offer costs only. Instead, post-offer costs could also be added to the
jury verdict to determine the "judgment finally obtained. 34
The appellate courts continue to uphold the rulings of the trial
courts, whether the trial court allows attorney fees or denies attorney
fees, when the Washington factors are considered and outlined in the
judgments. In the recent decision by the court of appeals in McDaniel
v. McBrayer35, the trial court's judgment granting attorney fees was
again upheld. 36 The McDaniel case illustrates the need for reform of
North Carolina General Statute Section 6-21.1. As Aristotle said:
"Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always re-
main unaltered.
37
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In McDaniel, the plaintiff retained counsel on January 9, 2002.38 Six
days later on January 15, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint for personal
injury from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on February 23,
1999. 39 Nothing in the record indicates that the plaintiff made a de-
mand for settlement before retaining counsel or before filing suit.4"
Defendants received service of the suit papers on February 4, 2002.41
After the defendants' insurer (Allstate Insurance Company) was ad-
vised that a suit had been filed, plaintiff allowed defendants an exten-
sion of time to answer and to allow negotiations of settlement of the
claim.42 The insurer for the defendants made an offer of settlement
for $4,500.00 to plaintiff on March 26, 2002. This occurred forty-five
days after the suit was received and before retaining defense counsel
to represent the insured.43 The offer was rejected and the insurer in-
creased its offer to $5,000.00. This offer was also rejected.44
33. Id. at 569.
34. Id. at 568.
35. McDaniel v. McBrayer, 595 S.E.2d 784 (N.C. App. 2004).
36. Id. at 788.
37. Aristotle, Politics (350 B.C.)
38. Record on Appeal at 2, McDaniel v. McBrayer, 595 S.E.2d 784 (N.C. App. 2004) (No.
COA03-939).
39. McDaniel, 595 S.E.2d at 786.
40. Record on Appeal at 2, McDaniel (No. COA03-939); Defendants -Appellants' Brief at
8 n.1, McDaniel v. McBrayer, 595 S.E.2d 784 (N.C. App. 2004) (No. COA03-939).
41. Record on Appeal at 4-5, McDaniel (No. COA 03-939).
42. Defendants-Appellants' Brief at 2-3, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id.
2004]
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After retaining defense counsel, a formal Offer of Judgment pursu-
ant to Rule 68 in the amount of $5,000.00, was served on plaintiff's
counsel on July 1, 2002. Plaintiff again rejected defendants' offer.45 A
Request for Monetary Relief Sought, pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2) of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, was served on plaintiff. De-
fendants received a response to the Request for Monetary Relief
Sought in the amount of $15,000.00.46
On October 10, 2002, a second Offer of Judgment for $5,000.00 pur-
suant to Rule 68 of the North Carolina of Civil Procedure was served
on plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff again rejected defendants' offer.4 7 Me-
diation was held on November 19, 2002. Defendants again offered
$5,000.00 to settle the case. Plaintiffs continued to demand
$15,000.00.48
During a pretrial conference at the term of court beginning April
21, 2003, defendants' counsel advised the court and plaintiff's counsel
that the $5,000.00 offer remained open. Plaintiff's counsel did not re-
spond to this offer and the case was tried. 49 The jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff for $800.00.50
Defendants filed a Motion for Costs in the amount of $754.67 be-
lieving that the verdict of $800.00 was less than the Offer of Judgment
of $5,000.00, and therefore defendants should be entitled to costs in-
curred after the first formal Offer of Judgment. 51 The Plaintiff also
filed a Motion for Costs requesting $1,437.90, in costs incurred and
$5,643.75 for attorney fees.52 Defendants' Motion for Costs was de-
nied. Plaintiff was awarded Judgment in the amount of $800.00 for thejury verdict plus costs in the amount of $1,437.90 and attorney's fees
in the amount of $4,500.00 pursuant to North Carolina General Stat-
ute Section 6-21.1. 53 The judge reduced plaintiff's attorney's fees by
$1,143.75. 54
Defendants appealed this ruling. The court of appeals upheld the
trial court's ruling awarding attorney's fees and found no abuse of dis-
cretion. 6 The court held that the trial court made its ruling based on
45. McDaniel, 595 S.E.2d at 786.
46. Record on Appeal at 34, McDaniel (No. COA03-939); Defendants-Appellants' Brief at
3, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
47. Record on Appeal at 34, McDaniel (No. COA03-939); Defendants-Appellants' Brief at
3, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
48. Record on Appeal at 34, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
49. Id. at 34.
50. McDaniel, 595 S.E.2d at 786.
51. Record on Appeal at 25-27, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
52. Id. at 33-39.
53. McDaniel, 595 S.E.2d at 786.
54. Record on Appeal at 40-42, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
55. McDaniel, 595 S.E.2d at 786.
56. Id. at 787.
7
Williams: McDaniel v. McBrayer: Reform Need for Rule 68 - The Pendulum of P
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2004
McDANIEL v. McBRAYER
the Washington factors, that the trial court had considered the entire
record as required and had made findings of fact to support its
ruling.57
ANALYSIS
Allowing plaintiffs an opportunity to have representation in small
claims is necessary and warranted, and North Carolina General Stat-
ute Section 6-21.1 provides the mechanism that allows attorneys who
take such cases to recover attorney fees. However, based on the cur-
rent precedent, defendants are being stripped of their protection as
provided in Rule 68 in various ways.
First, defendants are not given an opportunity to evaluate a claim to
determine if there is liability, or what amount of personal injury or
property damage was sustained by the negligence of the defendant,
before making a settlement offer. McDaniel is a prime example. One
of the Washington factors to be considered in determining whether to
award attorney fees pursuant to North Carolina General Statute Sec-
tion 6-21.1 is whether a settlement offer was made prior to suit being
filed.58 Nothing in the McDaniel record indicates that any demand
was made of the insurance company before suit was filed.59 In fact,
plaintiff filed suit only six days after retaining counsel. 60 Also, there is
no indication that plaintiff's counsel attempted to contact the insur-
ance company during the six days before suit was filed.6 1
The rationale that an offer should be made before a lawsuit is filed
seems ironic. The Rules of Civil Procedure allow for a discovery pe-
riod following the filing of a complaint wherein evidence may be ob-
tained by the parties through the discovery process to determine the
validity of plaintiff's allegations. 62 Expecting a settlement offer to be
made before a suit is filed, without proper documentation or investi-
gation, is unfair to the defendant. "An award of attorney fees should
not serve to punish proper case investigation and discovery by a de-
fendant's insurer. ' 6
3
The defendant in McDaniel argued to the court of appeals:
Such a decision discourages settlement and is tantamount to a guaran-
tee that lawyers will always be paid, even when they refuse reasonable
settlement offers in order to gamble on jury verdicts. The result of
57. Id.
58. Washington v. Horton, 513 S.E.2d 331, 334 (N.C. App. 1999).
59. Record on Appeal, McDaniel (No. COA03-939); Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 8 n.1,
McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
60. Record on Appeal at 2, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
61. Id. at 36.
62. N.C. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (2003).
63. Defendants-Appellants' Brief at 15, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
20041
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such gambles is increased expense, time, and effort for the courts, wit-
nesses, and parties. This Court has consistently held that Section 6-
21.1 should not be used to this end.6'
Another factor to be considered is the timing of the settlement of-
fers.65 In McDaniel, the insurance company made a settlement offer
within forty-five days of service of the complaint.66 Rule 68 provides
that an offer of judgment can be made anytime prior to ten days
before the case is called for trial.67 However, the Poole and Roberts
rulings, along with the Washington factors, appear to run in opposition
to Rule 68. The Washington factors place emphasis on the timing of
an offer.68 It appears this rationale suggests that the sooner an offer is
made the better. An early offer would give relief to the plaintiff for
damages incurred but at the same time would provide protection for
the defendant and cut off post-offer costs.
The amount of settlement offers are also to be compared to the jury
verdict.69 The McDaniel jury returned a verdict of $800.00.70 Defend-
ants offered $5,000.00 several times during the lawsuit, even offering
to pay $5,000.00 at the pre-trial conference."' While the trial judge's
findings of fact indicate that this factor was considered, 72 the tran-
script of the motion hearing does not reflect that consideration was
given to the timing of the offers of judgment.73 Instead, the transcript
indicates that after hearing argument by plaintiff's counsel, the judge
indicated that he had already made up his mind.74
The McDaniel jury heard the facts and made a determination that
McDaniel was entitled to $800.00. 75 Plaintiff did not question the ver-
dict of $800.00 the jury granted him for his damages. Instead, Plaintiff
only requested that he be awarded adjustments to the verdict to cover
the costs he had incurred in the amount of $1,437.90 and attorney fees
in the amount of $4,500.00.76
On July 1, 2002, defendant made an offer of judgment pursuant to
Rule 68 in the amount of $5,000.00. 7 ' Assuming plaintiff's counsel
was representing McDaniel on a standard one-third contingency fee,
64. Id. at 9.
65. Washington v. Horton, 513 S.E.2d 331, 334 (N.C. App. 1999).
66. Record on Appeal at 34, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
67. N.C. R. Civ. P. 68.
68. Washington, 513 S.E.2d at 334.
69. Id at 335.
70. McDaniel, 595 S.E.2d at 786.
71. Id.
72. Record on Appeal 40-42, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
73. Defendants-Appellants' Brief at App. 6, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
74. Id.
75. McDaniel, 595 S.E.2d at 786.
76. Record on Appeal at 33-35, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
77. McDaniel at 786.
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the plaintiff would have received $3,333.33 minus costs incurred of
$80.00 as of that date.78 The plaintiff would have been compensated
more than four times the verdict of $800.00 that the jury believed to
be the damages sustained. 9 The one-third contingency fee would
have been $1,666.67. As of that date, plaintiff's counsel had incurred
5.48 hours at $150.00 an hour or $822.00 in time expended.80 Had the
offer of judgment been accepted, the attorney would have received
more than twice his hourly rate.
The Rules of Professional Conduct state that, "A lawyer shall not
acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter
of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client ... "81 Are plaintiffs
rejecting offers of judgment upon advice of counsel? Are attorneys
tempted to reject offers of judgment in smaller cases because attor-
ney's fees are usually awarded? Is the supreme court's belief that
plaintiffs are entitled to have costs and attorney fees added to jury
verdicts to determine if it surpasses an offer of judgment creating an
ethical dilemma for plaintiff's counsel?
It is obvious that attorneys for plaintiffs and attorneys for defend-
ants evaluate cases differently. It is common belief that attorneys for
plaintiffs evaluate claims high and attorneys for defendants make low
offers. Our legal system requires citizens to serve as jurors.82 Jurors
are asked to listen to the facts of a case and make a determination
regarding what, if anything, a plaintiff is entitled to recover. 83 Al-
lowing adjustments to a jury verdict not only strips the defendant of
any protection from a plaintiff refusing to critically evaluate their
claim, it also undermines the jury's role in evaluating the facts of a
case and making a determination as to what a plaintiff is entitled to
recover.
If the Washington factors had been strictly considered in McDaniel,
the court should not have granted plaintiff's motion for attorney fees.
Nothing in the record indicates that the defendants did not timely re-
spond to plaintiff but instead shows the defendants responded quickly
and with a reasonable offer.84
Plaintiffs should be awarded costs and attorney fees if a defendant
fails to make reasonable offers to settle when an offer is merited,
when an insurance company is using unreasonable bargaining power
against a plaintiff, or when a defendant fails to make a reasonable
78. Record on Appeal at 39, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
79. Id. at 40.
80. Id. at 33-38.
81. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. xxvii, r. 1.08(i) (2004).
82. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 26; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-6, -10 (2004).
83. N.C.P.I. - Civil 101.50. It is the duty of the jury to recall and consider all the evidence.
84. Record on Appeal, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
2004]
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offer before trial is imminent. However, when an offer has been made
and is ultimately determined to be more than reasonable based on the
jury's verdict, defendants should not be punished for failing to give in
to plaintiff's demands for settlement that are too high. In McDaniel,
plaintiff never attempted to negotiate a compromise settlement.85
Rule 68 was designed to encourage settlement of cases.86 The court
system continues to encourage the settlement of cases prior to trial.
Mediation has become common in most North Carolina superior
court cases.87 The rulings in Poole, Roberts and Washington are
counterproductive to the encouragement of settlement. Instead, these
rulings encourage plaintiffs to take a case to trial, knowing that a small
verdict may, in the court's discretion, lead to a larger "judgment fi-
nally obtained" when costs and attorney's fees are tacked on. Even
after the judge taxes attorney's fees, the ultimate recovery for the
plaintiff remains the verdict reached by the jury.
Defendants have no recourse for attempting to negotiate in good
faith for judgments finally obtained for $10,000.00 or less. Before
Poole, if defendants made an offer of judgment, then plaintiffs were
not entitled to costs or attorney fees after the offer of judgment was
made.88 Now, defendants are placed in the dilemma of having to de-
termine whether to offer more than $10,000.00 for claims that are not
worth $10,000.00 to avoid adjustments being made to the verdict by
the trial judge. Defendants are being punished even after making rea-
sonable offers of judgment. Plaintiffs have no incentive to evaluate
their claims reasonably.
The dissent in Poole by Justice Parker stressed the concerns that
seem to echo through the continuous appeals surrounding the taxing
of attorney's fees after an offer of judgment.89 Justice Parker believed
"the majority's construction of the Rule,... undermines the intent of
the legislature in adopting Rule 68(a). The objective of the Rule is to
encourage settlements. "90 Justice Parker felt that because Rule 68(a)
of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure was almost identical to
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Marryshow, which
interpreted federal Rule 68, could provide guidance to the state courts
in determining how to compare "judgment finally obtained" to an of-
85. Id.
86. Scallon v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843, 844 (N.C. App. 1982).
87. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1 (2004).
88. "We agree with plaintiff's argument that he is entitled to recover from defendant the
attorney's fees which were incurred prior to the time the offer of judgment was made. The Rule
68 sanctions only provide protection against the costs incurred after the offer has been made."
Purdy v. Brown, 296 S.E.2d 459, 463 (N.C. 1982).
89. Poole v. Miller, 464 S.E.2d 409 (N.C. 1995) (Parker, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 413.
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fer of judgment.91 The court in Marryshow held that costs and attor-
ney fees should be added to the verdict, but only in an amount equal
to the costs and attorney fees incurred up until the offer of judgment
made pursuant to Rule 68.92 This would provide an equivalent mea-
sure. Otherwise, if costs and attorney fees incurred after the offer of
judgment were allowed to be added to the verdict, then the compari-
son would not be equitable and would provide a means to defeat the
purpose of Rule 68.9 3 Marryshow follows closely the precedent of
Purdy, which was the law before Poole. The court in Purdy held that
costs incurred after an offer of judgment could not be added as costs
to the verdict.94
The North Carolina courts have hinted that there is a problem with
the current precedent regarding Rule 68. For example, in Williams v.
Manus,95 the jury awarded plaintiff $62.00 after defendant had made
an offer of judgment of $501.00.96 The trial court then awarded
$5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Although Williams was reversed on the
grounds that the trial court failed to make findings of fact, the dicta
implied that an award of attorney's fees in light of the small verdict
might be unreasonable.97
In McDaniel, the transcript of the hearing on the motion for costs
indicates that trial court Judge Larry Ford believed he did not have a
choice in awarding attorney's fees. The transcript also reflects Judge
Ford's unhappiness with the decisions in Poole and Roberts, which are
now binding on the trial courts. Judge Ford stated:
Back in the good old days if the defense counsel filed an offer of set-
tlement and the plaintiff got less than that, that was the end of it.
Guess what? The higher courts changed that position and it would
have been a lot simpler if they'd have left us alone and let us go the
old way.9
8
The Judge went on to discuss an Iredell County case where the
court of appeals recently upheld a court's award of attorney's fees in
the amount of $9,500.00 where an offer of judgment of $5,000.00 had
been made and the subsequent verdict was $211.00. The Judge stated:
But I believe it was an Iredell County case. And there again, once
again, I think that case illustrates the preposterousness that all this has
91. Id.
92. Marryshow v. Flynn, 986 F.2d 689, 692 (4th Cir. 1993).
93. Id.
94. Purdy v. Brown, 496 S.E.2d 459, 463 (N.C. 1982).
95. Williams v. Manus, 542 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. App. 2001).
96. Id. at 681-82.
97. Id.
98. Defendants-Appellants' Brief at App. 3, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
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gotten to. You know, I think everybody is entitled to their jury trial,
but, oh, lord.99 (emphasis added).
Defense counsel then argued against plaintiff's motion for costs. In
his argument he stated that he believed the "Williams case emphasizes
the fact that sometimes there is still such a disparity between the ver-
dict amount and the offer of judgment that attorneys fees which would
otherwise be reasonable are no longer so.""' Judge Ford responded:
No, I read what you had underlined here and the problem is here, and
let me say this, that the chief judge in that case and I were good
friends in law school and are still close friends today. And I respect
him, I think he's a fine lawyer and he's been a fine judge. And I, but I
think what's happened, quite often we come up with all these little
finely tuned things in the court system and we wind up painting our-
selves into a corner. And the Williams case shows where they're try-
ing to get out of a corner without messing up the paint they've already
painted. But in my opinion what they did is they stepped on it
anyway.' 01
Even the Supreme Court has suggested a need for change. The
Roberts court stated:
As in Poole, defendants argue that including costs and attorney's fees
incurred after an offer of judgment in calculating the "judgment fi-
nally obtained" discourages the settlement of cases .... In view of the
precedent of Poole, including the dissenting opinion therein, we be-
lieve defendants' argument would be better addressed to the legisla-
tive branch of government.10 2
CONCLUSION
There needs to be reform of the precedent established in Poole and
Roberts regarding Rule 68. As indicated above, trial courts, appellate
courts, and litigants share concerns that the fine tuning of the law has
created more problems than it has resolved. Unfortunately, there
does not appear to be any move by the North Carolina Supreme
Court toward an undoing of the tangled web the interpretation of
Rule 68 has created. In McDaniel, the defendant was not given an
opportunity to settle the claim before suit was filed, but did make a
reasonable settlement offer early in the litigation. Even though the
offer was rejected, the defendants continued throughout the litigation
process to attempt to settle the claim. The amount offered would
have compensated the plaintiff fairly and would have covered costs
incurred and attorney's fees. Quoting Judge Larry Ford, "this illus-
99. Id. at App. 5.
100. Id. at App. 9.
101. Id. at App. 9-10.
102. Roberts, 538 S.E.2d at 569 (N.C. 2000).
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trates the preposterousness that all this has gotten to.' 10 3 The prece-
dent before Poole recognized that defendants should not be punished
after making reasonable offers of judgment.'04 As stated in the Poole
dissent, the federal court decision in Marryshow held that in order to
make a proper comparison between an offer of judgment that includes
costs incurred and the judgment finally obtained, only costs incurred
up until the offer of judgment should be added to the verdict.'0 5 Mar-
ryshow allows the pendulum to swing evenly, not too far to the right
or to the left. It is time for the Legislature to stop the pendulum from
swinging unevenly in favor of the plaintiffs. While there must be pro-
tection for plaintiffs who have suffered loss, there must also be a de-
vice in place to protect defendants from paying costs and attorney's
fees after making a reasonable offer. Such a balance not only protects
plaintiffs in their quest for justice, but also protects defendants after a
reasonable offer has been made.
103. Defendants-Appellants' Brief at App. 5, McDaniel (No. COA03-939).
104. Purdy, 296 S.E.2d at 463.
105. Marryshow v. Flynn, 986 F.2d 689, 692 (4th Cir. 1993).
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